Fordham Law Review
Volume 87

Issue 2

Article 9

2018

How the Feres Doctrine Prevents Cadets and Midshipmen of
Military-Service Academies from Achieving Justice for Sexul
Assault
Katherine Shin
Fordham University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Military, War, and Peace Commons

Recommended Citation
Katherine Shin, How the Feres Doctrine Prevents Cadets and Midshipmen of Military-Service Academies
from Achieving Justice for Sexul Assault, 87 Fordham L. Rev. 767 (2018).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol87/iss2/9

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

HOW THE FERES DOCTRINE PREVENTS CADETS
AND MIDSHIPMEN OF MILITARY-SERVICE
ACADEMIES FROM ACHIEVING JUSTICE FOR
SEXUAL ASSAULT
Katherine Shin*
Sixty-seven years ago, Feres v. United States foreclosed service members
from pursuing claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for
“injuries incident to their service.” The progeny of case law that has since
developed, the basis for what is known as the Feres doctrine, expanded the
scope of what the Feres Court originally articulated as an injury incident to
service. Now, cadets and midshipmen of military-service academies who
allege that the government (i.e., the administration of military-service
academies) was negligent in handling their sexual assaults are precluded
from bringing an FTCA claim because their injuries are classified as
“incident to their service” under Feres.
Cadets and midshipmen occupy an ambiguous status as both service
members and students of military-service academies. Although cadets and
midshipmen are considered service members under the law, they are also
students of military-service academies where they will graduate with a
bachelor’s degree and incur an active-duty obligation to serve in the officer
corps of the U.S. Armed Forces after they graduate.
This Note focuses on the ambiguous status of cadets and midshipmen and
argues that they are more akin to students of civilian colleges than activeduty service members. Unlike cadets and midshipmen, civilian students can
raise Title IX claims against their universities for student-on-student sexual
harassment or assault. By comparing how claims fare for cadets and
midshipmen under Feres to the same claims by civilian students under Title
IX, this Note argues that cadets and midshipmen do not have the same
opportunity to achieve justice as civilian students in like circumstances.
This Note additionally examines the legal and policy arguments against
extending the Feres doctrine to cadets and midshipmen. Considering the
evidence that suggests when superiors allow sexual harassment it may lead
to higher instances of sexual harassment and assault in the military ranks,
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2015, University of
California, San Diego. I would like to thank Professor Thomas H. Lee for his invaluable
insights and thoughtful guidance and the staff of the Fordham Law Review for their assistance.
I also owe my thanks to my family and friends for their support. This Note is dedicated to the
men and women of the United States Armed Forces and my late brother, Sebastian C. Shin.
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this Note urges Congress to reexamine the FTCA to limit the scope of the
judicially made Feres doctrine to exclude cadets and midshipmen from
bringing FTCA claims for the negligent mismanagement of their sexual
assaults by academy administration.
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INTRODUCTION
The word is out! If you are a rapist, go into the military where you will be
protected after you rape someone.
—Annie Kendzior, former Midshipman at the U.S. Naval Academy1

Around 1:00 a.m. on May 9, 2010,2 Jane Doe,3 a college student, agreed
to go out for a walk with a fellow student and friend, Robert Smith.4 On the
surface, Doe’s night seems no different than what any young person might
encounter as part of the typical U.S. college experience.
Jane Doe was a cadet at the United States Military Academy—commonly
known as West Point.5 Doe had graduated at the top of her high school class
and was nominated by one of her senators as the “top candidate in her state.”6
Doe applied to West Point in the hopes of attending a prestigious four-year
college that produced women of “leadership, honor, and dignity.”7 Unlike
graduates of civilian colleges, however, West Point cadets incur a military-

1. Overview of the Annual Report on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the Military
Service Academies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Military Personnel of the H. Comm. on
Armed Servs., 115th Cong. 64 (2017) [hereinafter MSA Sexual Violence Hearing] (statement
of Annie Kendzior).
2. The facts set forth in this Introduction are based entirely upon the plaintiff’s amended
complaint. In reviewing the district court’s decision in the dismissal stage, the Second Circuit
took these allegations as true and construed them in the most favorable light to the plaintiff.
See Doe v. Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d 36, 38–40, 50–51 (2d Cir. 2017).
3. Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein of the Southern District of New York granted Jane Doe’s
motion to use a pseudonym for her court proceedings. The defendants did not object. Doe v.
Hagenbeck, 98 F. Supp. 3d 672, 676 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
4. The use of this pseudonym was also granted. Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d at 40 n.2.
5. Id.
6. Second Amended Complaint at 2, Doe v. Hagenbeck, 98 F. Supp. 3d 672 (S.D.N.Y.
2015) (No. 13 Civ. 2802 (AKH)), ECF No. 40. To apply for admission to West Point or any
other military-service academy, a candidate must fulfill basic age, marital, medical, and
physical requirements. The applicant must also receive a congressional nomination from
either their representatives, one of their senators, or the Vice President of the United States.
Steps to Admissions:
The West Point Application Process, W. POINT,
https://www.usma.edu/admissions/SitePages/Steps.aspx [https://perma.cc/JAZ3-TSFQ] (last
visited Oct. 4, 2018).
7. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 6, at 2.
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service obligation as commissioned officers of the U.S. Army upon
graduation.8
At first, Doe excelled in everything West Point had to offer. She joined
extracurricular activities and achieved high grades in her courses.9 One
faculty member noted that Doe was “one of the most professional and
internally motivated cadets I’ve worked with” and that he “would gladly
recruit her to serve on my team, regardless of the mission.”10 However, over
time, Doe began to feel increasingly isolated.11 Doe was one of
approximately two hundred women that made up 15 percent of her college
class.12 West Point’s hypermasculine culture, condoned and implicitly
encouraged by school administrators and the policies they enacted, entailed
constant gender-based harassment and degradation.13 For example, cadets
participating in team-building activities would shout crude, sexually charged
chants such as: “I wish that all the ladies / were holes in the road / and I was
a dump truck / I’d fill ’em with my load . . . I wish that all the ladies / were
statues of Venus / and I was a sculptor / I’d break ’em with my penis.”14
Faculty did not intervene to mitigate this hostile environment and sometimes
encouraged it by sympathizing with heterosexual male cadets about the
difficulty of getting sex at West Point.15 Some school policies echoed
surprisingly archaic and discriminatory gender-based practices, for instance,
requiring only female cadets to test for sexually transmitted diseases.16 West
Point’s administrators not only implemented these policies, they also failed
to protect female cadets who reported unwanted sexual contact from male
supervisors.17 It comes as no surprise that, in the midst of this environment,
Doe sought medical attention and was prescribed a mild sedative for
anxiety.18
On this particular day, Doe took her anxiety medication before the early
morning walk with Robert Smith.19 Unbeknownst to her, the medication
began to interact with alcohol Smith provided, and Doe slipped into
unconsciousness.20 When she awoke, Doe found herself covered in dirt and
bruises, with blood between her legs.21 The physical evidence indicated that
Smith had raped her when she lost consciousness.22

8. Your Career After West Point, W. POINT, https://www.usma.edu/admissions/
SitePages/Careers.aspx [https://perma.cc/M84X-WX3T] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
9. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 6, at 4.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 5.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 6.
16. Id. at 8–9.
17. Id. at 7.
18. Id. at 10–11.
19. Id. at 11–12.
20. Id. at 12.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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The West Point administrators’ post-sexual-assault intervention only
prolonged Doe’s trauma. The school nurse failed to preserve any evidence
of the sexual assault23 and Doe met with West Point’s designated sexual
assault response counselor only once, who explained that Doe had the choice
of filing either an unrestricted or a restricted report.24 Doe decided to file a
restricted report which did not call for official action and did not name the
perpetrator.25 Doe, like many other survivors of sexual assault at militaryservice academies, feared retaliation and tarnishing her reputation at West
Point.26 She did not want to be labeled as a “troublemaker” for breaking
rules, being out past curfew, and for drinking alcohol with Smith.27 Even
though Doe had filed a report, she received only one email two weeks later
from another counselor who had apparently been referred Doe’s case from
her original counselor.28 West Point failed to extend Doe the support she
needed.29 Ultimately, Jane Doe chose to resign from West Point, and in
August 2010, she was honorably discharged from the Army.30
Sadly, Doe’s story is not uncommon, even today. According to an annual
report on sexual harassment and assault at military-service academies
(MSAs), a total of eighty-six reports of sexual assault were made at the three
MSAs from 2015 to 2016.31 Out of this total, twenty-six reports were filed
at West Point.32 Compared to when Doe had attended West Point, the total
number of reports made at West Point has increased by sixteen.33 In
addition, the total reported sexual assaults at all MSAs has increased by nine
reports since Doe’s attendance.34 Although the Department of Defense
(DoD) has hypothesized that the increased reporting may have been the result
of more people willing to report assaults, the fact remains that sexual assault

23. Id.
24. Unlike unrestricted reports, restricted reports do not initiate official action and do not
disclose the name of the perpetrator. See Doe v. Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d 36, 40 (2d Cir. 2017).
25. Second Amended Complaint, supra note 6, at 13.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 14.
30. Id.
31. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND VIOLENCE AT THE
MILITARY SERVICE ACADEMIES, ACADEMIC PROGRAM YEAR 2015–2016, at 5–6 (2016),
http://sapr.mil/public/docs/reports/MSA/APY_15-16/APY_15_16_MSA_Report_v2
[https://perma.cc/7X4P-UYG7]. The five federal military-service academies are: U.S.
Military Academy, U.S. Naval Academy, U.S. Air Force Academy, U.S. Coast Guard
Academy, and U.S. Merchant Marine Academy. This Note will specifically focus on the first
three military-service academies because their graduates are commissioned into the traditional
U.S. Armed Forces and, more importantly, because they are the oldest and most prestigious
military institutions, viewed by the public as comparable to the most elite U.S. civilian
colleges. See infra Part II.
32. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 31, at 8.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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is a persistent issue not only at MSAs, but in the U.S. Armed Forces
generally.35
Moreover, cadets and midshipmen (i.e., cadets at the U.S. Naval Academy;
“midshipwomen” is never used) are limited in their abilities to pursue justice
for sexual assault.36 Due to their status as service members while attending
their respective academies, cadets and midshipmen are denied the due
process civilian college students would receive in similar situations.37 This
unequal treatment is puzzling when one considers that the three highly
prestigious MSAs present themselves as equals to elite civilian colleges and
in fact compete with them for blue-chip applicants.38 Given the social
salience and current controversy regarding sexual harassment and assault,39
it is worth reexamining the basis of this differential treatment and reassessing
whether it should continue as a matter of law.
This Note will examine the two common claims that military sexual assault
victims pursue: (1) Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) claims against the
United States for negligent supervision of federal employees, and
(2) Bivens40 claims against individual defendants for violations of the
constitutionally protected right of equal protection stemming from gender
discrimination. This Note will focus primarily on the Feres41 doctrine
governing the underlying reasons for prohibiting military service members—
including cadets and midshipmen at the MSAs—from pursuing these two
categories of claims. Part I.A describes Feres and subsequent cases that have
come to form the Feres doctrine. Part I.B surveys how subsequent U.S.
Supreme Court decisions have shaped the Feres doctrine and how it is
applied in lower courts.
Part II provides an overview of Title IX and discusses how other highereducation institutions approach sexual harassment and assault claims under
Title IX. Part III evaluates how a hypothetical claim brought by a cadet under
Title IX would play out and compares those results to how courts currently
resolve such claims under the Feres doctrine.
By comparing MSAs and other higher-education institutions in light of
Title IX and the Feres doctrine, Part IV argues that Feres raises legal and
policy concerns when applied to cadets and midshipmen with sexual assault
35. See Lolita C. Baldor, Sexual Assault Reports Up at Navy, Army Academies, PBS NEWS
HOUR (Mar. 15, 2017, 1:58 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/sexual-assaultreports-navy-army-academies [https://perma.cc/Q85W-7CVY]; Aria Bendix, U.S. Naval and
Military Academies See Rise in Sexual Assault, ATLANTIC (Mar. 16, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/03/us-naval-and-military-academiessee-rise-in-sexual-assault/519912/ [https://perma.cc/98FD-5ZCN]; Helene Cooper, Reports of
Sexual Assault Increase at Two Military Academies, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2017),
https://nyti.ms/2mKUqTi [https://perma.cc/YD5S-BKWW].
36. See infra Part III.A.
37. See infra Part III.A.
38. See infra Part II.
39. See infra Part IV.B.1.
40. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
41. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
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and discrimination claims. In particular, this Part explores how military
superiors who allow sexual harassment contribute to an increased likelihood
of sexual harassment or assaults and how this impacts cadets and
midshipmen. Accordingly, Part V proposes a model statute Congress could
enact to carve such issues arising at MSAs out from Feres doctrine coverage.
I. THE MILITARY: FERES DOCTRINE AND BIVENS CLAIMS
To understand how courts consider MSA sexual assault claims under the
FTCA, it is important to understand the Feres doctrine and Bivens claim
jurisprudence. Part I.A discusses the Federal Tort Claims Act and the
Supreme Court decisions that substantially narrowed its application in Feres
and its progeny. Part I.B then describes Bivens, which recognized an implied
cause of action for damages on the part of individuals whose constitutional
rights were violated, as well as subsequent Bivens case law.
A. The Feres Doctrine: FTCA Claims and Bivens Claims
The Feres doctrine first developed as a judicially made doctrine to address
tort claims brought by service members against the government. In its
infancy, the Feres doctrine recognized that service members may be injured
by other federal employees, outside the scope of their activities as soldiers,
and that their status as soldiers did not grant the government blanket
immunity from service members’ tort claims.42 However, as Parts I.A.1 and
I.A.2 show, the Supreme Court, with each subsequent iteration, developed
and expanded the Feres doctrine to consider more factors in its analysis of
whether the service member could recover damages against the government,
which in effect, narrowed the likelihood of recovery for service members
who brought claims under the FTCA.
1. Laying the Foundation: Brooks and Feres
Congress enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act43 to allow tort claims
against the United States for injuries caused by federal employees44 acting in

42. See Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 50–52 (1949).
43. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–80 (2012). Federal courts have original jurisdiction for FTCA
claims:
[T]he district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims
against the United States, for money damages, . . . for injury or loss of property, or
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or
employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person,
would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the
act or omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2012); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (establishing the scope of liability
of the United States).
44. Under the FTCA, federal employees include “officers or employees of any federal
agency, members of the military or naval forces of the United States, [and] members of the
National Guard while engaged in training or duty . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2671.
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their official capacity.45 Within the military context, the Supreme Court held
in Brooks v. United States46 that members of the United States Armed Forces
could pursue remedies under the FTCA and allowed military service
members to recover against the government for injuries they sustained “not
incident to their service.”47
A year later, the Supreme Court defined what “incident to service” meant
in Feres v. United States.48 Feres was actually three separate cases49
consolidated into one, each raising the question of whether an active-duty
service member who sustained an injury due to the negligence of other
military personnel and under other circumstances suffered an actionable
wrong, can recover under the FTCA.50 The Supreme Court gave a negative
answer in all three cases, effectively rendering a vanishingly narrow
interpretation of Brooks’s “not incident to service” rider, much to the dismay
of present and future service member claimants.
The Feres Court’s reasoning behind its “incident to service” rule can be
broken down into three parts. First, the Court considered whether
recognizing the service members’ claims under the FTCA would create new
causes of action that Congress did not intend. Second, the Court discussed
how service members’ and the federal government’s relationship is defined
by federal laws and how this relationship conflicts with the FTCA’s
construction of state tort law to govern liability. Third, the Court discussed
other statutory provisions that already provide remedies for service
members’ injuries and used them as a reason to construe their ability to obtain
FTCA remedies narrowly.
The Feres Court recognized that the FTCA was the “culmination of a long
effort to mitigate unjust consequences of sovereign immunity from suit.”51
These unjust consequences stemmed from the fact that, but for the
happenstance that wrongs had been committed by a federal employee, the
injured would have had an opportunity to seek legal recourse in court.52 Even
though Congress enacted the FTCA to provide relief for the government
employees’ tortious actions, Congress explicitly included a “private
liabilities” test to make clear that the claims actionable under the FTCA were
45. Under the FTCA, military personnel acting in an official capacity means “acting in
[the] line of duty.” Id.
46. 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
47. See id. at 50.
48. 340 U.S. 135, 144 (1950). To determine whether a service member’s claim is
precluded under the Feres doctrine, courts analyze whether the service member’s injury was
incident to service. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 682 (1987). This Note
will refer to this line of analysis as the “incident-to-service” test.
49. The three claimants were (1) the executrix of service member Feres recovering for his
death due to a fire in his barracks at Pine Camp, New York; (2) plaintiff service member
Jefferson who brought a medical malpractice suit after he was found to have a towel marked
“Medical Department U.S. Army” in his stomach during a surgical procedure; and (3) the
executrix of service member Griggs who died from alleged negligent medical treatment by
army surgeons. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 136–37.
50. Id. at 138.
51. Id. at 139.
52. See id. at 139–40.
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those that might also be brought against a private tortfeasor.53 Put another
way, Congress did not want to expose the government to “novel and
unprecedented liabilities.”54 Applying this principle—that Congress enacted
the FTCA in part to limit the government’s liability to existing causes of
action—the Court held in Feres that there were no laws on the books or
doctrine in common law permitting military personnel to recover monetary
damages from their superior officers or from the government, and therefore
it could not validate the plaintiffs’ FTCA claims.55
On the other hand, the Court did acknowledge that but for the status of the
claimant as a service member and the government as a sovereign, private
liability would exist for injuries arising from the negligence of federal
employees.56 However, the Court noted that “the liability assumed by the
Government here is that created by ‘all the circumstances,’ not that which a
few of the circumstances might create.”57 Or, in simpler terms, the Court
recognized that the claimant’s status as a service member and the
government’s status as a sovereign could not be separated from the cause of
action.
Further, the FTCA explicitly designates “the law of the place where the act
or omission occurred” to determine the substantive law governing a tort
claim.58 The Court reasoned that since the military designates the location
and the duration of a service member’s service, hinging the scope of liability
for injuries incident to service on the location of where the injury occurred
would not be rational due to the fact that each states’ limitation on liability
differs drastically.59 Moreover, as the Court articulated in United States v.
Standard Oil Co.,60 the service members’ relationship with the government
is “distinctively federal in character” and ultimately controlled by federal,
not state, authority.61
Lastly, the Court discussed the federal compensation systems in place that
already provide remedies for discharged service members, widows, or
surviving family members.62 The Court noted that two of the plaintiffs had
received adequate payments from the government for the injuries the service
members sustained.63

53. See id. at 141. “The United States shall be liable . . . in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.” 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2012).
54. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 142.
55. See id.
56. See id. (recognizing that a civilian doctor would be subject to malpractice liability
under similar circumstances).
57. Id.
58. See id. at 143 (quoting the FTCA).
59. Id.
60. 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
61. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 143–44 (quoting Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. at 305–06).
62. Id. at 145.
63. See id.
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2. Three Broad Rationales: Stencel Aero and Johnson
The Feres Court’s initial articulation of the incident-to-service rule did not
last long. Over time, the Supreme Court clarified its initial incident-toservice rule with “three broad rationales.” The Supreme Court first
articulated the rationales in 1977 in Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United
States,64 and relied on them for rulings ten years later in United States v.
Johnson.65 In Stencel Aero, the Supreme Court defined Feres’s three broad
rationales as: (1) the federal relationship between the government and
service members; (2) an alternative compensation scheme, such as the
Veterans’ Benefits Act (VBA) that provides for injuries sustained by service
members; and (3)
[t]he peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the
effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme
results that might obtain if suits under the Tort Claims Act were allowed
for negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of
military duty.66

To summarize and for ease of reference, this Note will refer to the three
rationales as: (1) the uniquely federal nature of military service; (2) the
presence of alternative compensation schemes; and (3) the deleterious effect
of superiors’ legal liability on military good order and discipline.
Feres had articulated the first two rationales, but the scope was expanded
in Johnson. The Johnson Court extended the Feres doctrine to injuries not
only caused by other military personnel, but also injuries caused by federal
civilian employees.67 The Court explained that the military-or-not status of
the alleged tortfeasor was irrelevant to the Feres analysis, which had been
confined to alleged liability of other service members.68 What was
dispositive under Feres, rather, was the claimant’s status as a member of the
military.69
The second rationale also mentioned in Feres—the existence of an
alternative compensation system for service members—was expanded
further under Stencel Aero and affirmed in Johnson. The Johnson Court
noted that Congress most likely did not intend for service members to recover
under the FTCA for injuries incident to service when the VBA already
provided for such injuries.70 Moreover, the Johnson Court rearticulated their
finding in Stencel Aero that VBA compensation was the “upper limit of
liability” the government was responsible for regarding injuries incident to
service.71
64. 431 U.S. 666, 671–72 (1977).
65. 481 U.S. 681, 688–91 (1987).
66. Stencel Aero, 431 U.S. at 671–72 (quoting United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112
(1954)).
67. See Johnson, 481 U.S. at 686–88.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 689.
70. See id. at 689–90.
71. See id. at 690.
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Out of all the rationales articulated by the Johnson Court, the third
rationale, new to the relevant jurisprudence, has become the most persuasive
for federal courts applying the Feres doctrine.72 Unlike other occupations,
the Johnson Court reasoned, the military requires the “obedience, unity,
commitment, and esprit de corps” of its members to protect and serve the
country.73 Given this “specialized society,” the Court concluded that the
judiciary should not interfere in the military’s mission by allowing tort claims
by service members against their superiors that might undermine the need for
good order and discipline in the military.74
To summarize, in Johnson, the Supreme Court, while purporting to clarify
Feres, effectively expanded its reach by foreclosing service members’ claims
for injuries caused by civilian employees and simultaneously signaled to
future claimants that the Court was unwilling to “undermine the commitment
essential to effective service” and thereby “disrupt” military good order and
discipline.75
B. Bivens Claims and the Feres Doctrine
By the time Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics76 was decided, the Feres doctrine had effectively closed off legal
recourse in civilian courts under the FTCA for service members who
sustained injuries “incident to their service,” broadly defined.77 Given the
background presumption of federal sovereign immunity that the FTCA
waived, this meant that service members had no plausible option for seeking
remedies in court for service-related injuries. Bivens, however, suggested a
new route for military personnel to raise constitutional claims for money
damages. But as the Court grafted Feres onto Bivens and narrowed Bivens
itself, the promise revealed itself to be a false hope.
1. Bivens: A New Path to Recovery?
Bivens did not concern a tort claim between a service member and the
government, but rather a constitutional claim brought by a private citizen
against the government.78 Webster Bivens alleged that agents of the Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, acting in their official capacity, entered and searched
72. Even though the Johnson Court referred to three broad rationales, the first two
rationales had already been found to be “no longer controlling” by the time Johnson was
decided. See Regan v. Starcraft Marine, LLC, 524 F.3d 627, 635 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Shearer v. United States, 473 U.S. 52, 58 n.4 (1985)).
73. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 691 (quoting Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507
(1986)).
74. See id. at 690–91 (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974)).
75. See id. at 691.
76. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
77. Bivens was decided before the Supreme Court articulated the three broad rationales in
Stencel Aero and Johnson. See Jonathan P. Tomes, Feres to Chappell to Stanley: Three Strikes
and Servicemembers Are Out, 25 U. RICH. L. REV. 93, 96–98 (1990) (discussing the outcomes
of Feres and Johnson).
78. 403 U.S. at 389.
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his residence without a warrant, threatened to arrest his family, and
subsequently arrested him without probable cause.79 He claimed to have
suffered injuries as a result of the agents’ violations of his constitutional
rights under the Fourth Amendment and sued for $15,000 in damages from
each agent.80
The Bivens Court recognized that, even though the Fourth Amendment did
not explicitly provide for recovery of damages,81 an award of money
damages was an appropriate form of remedy given that Bivens had no other
real options for redress for this constitutional violation.82 The Court
specifically pointed out that recognizing an implied cause of action in the
case was fitting because there were no “special factors counselling hesitation
in the absence of affirmative action by Congress.”83 Furthermore, since
Congress had not explicitly prohibited individuals from seeking damages for
injuries arising from a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights, the Court
found that it was within its power to find an implied cause of action.84 Bivens
thus promised an avenue for service members to bring claims for
constitutional violations against the government, despite the absence of
authorization by congressional statute (i.e., the FTCA, as construed by Feres
and its progeny).
2. Chappell v. Wallace: “Caution, Red Light Ahead”
Although, in theory, service members might bring Bivens actions for
service-related injuries implicating constitutionally protected rights, the
Supreme Court eventually invoked Justice William Brennan’s “special
factors counselling hesitation” language in Bivens to foreclose that
possibility.85 In 1983, the Court, channeling Feres, held in Chappell v.
Wallace86 that service members could not bring an action for injuries incident
to service, whether framed as constitutional or FTCA claims.87
In Chappell, five enlisted members of the Navy brought an action seeking
damages and other remedies against the officers who commanded the vessel
on which they served.88 They sued for damages under Bivens, alleging that
their superior officers engaged in racial discrimination in violation of their
Fifth Amendment rights.89 The District Court for the Southern District of
79. Id.
80. See id. at 390.
81. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”).
82. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396 (citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
83. Id.
84. See id. at 397.
85. Id. at 396.
86. 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
87. See id. at 305.
88. Id. at 297.
89. Id. In the original suit, respondents brought a Fifth Amendment equal protection claim
and a claim of conspiracy to deprive them of their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)
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California dismissed their claims because, among other reasons,90 the
decisions of the U.S. Navy were nonreviewable.91 On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit reversed and found that Bivens authorized the sailors’ claims and
articulated factors for the lower courts to utilize when assessing Bivens
claims.92
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that it was inappropriate to extend
Bivens due to the “special factors counselling hesitation” within the context
of the military.93 The Court reasoned that the “peculiar and special
relationship of the soldier to his superiors,”94 as well as the “need for special
regulations in relation to military discipline, and the consequent need and
justification for a special and exclusive system of military justice”95 requires
the judiciary to exercise caution before allowing a Bivens claim to proceed.
The Court was elaborating, essentially, on the third rationale it would ratify
five years later in Johnson: the special need for good order and discipline in
the military and the deleterious effect that superiors’ liability might have on
it.96 The Chappell Court reasoned that the nature of the military institution
required freedom to discipline soldiers and sailors through the internal chain
of command without undue interference from the courts.97
Not only did the Chappell Court emphasize the judiciary’s need to respect
military good order and discipline, it also emphasized the Constitution’s
explicit delegation of regulation of the armed forces to Congress.98 Due to
the legislative and executive branches’ constitutional powers over the armed
forces, the Chappell Court invoked the separation-of-powers principle as an
underlying reason for concluding that courts need to exercise great caution
when recognizing an implied cause of action for service members absent
explicit guidance from Congress.99

(1976). Id. The Fifth Amendment constitutional claim is the only relevant claim for the
purposes of this Note. The Supreme Court in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979), allowed
Fifth Amendment due process claims to be brought under Bivens. See Wallace v. Chappell,
661 F.2d 729, 730 n.1 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d, 462 U.S. 296 (1983).
90. The district court also reasoned that the service members had not exhausted available
administrative remedies. See Chappell, 462 U.S. at 298.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 299 (quoting United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954)).
95. Id. at 300.
96. Although the Supreme Court initially identified this factor in Brown, the Court did not
specifically identify the military relationship and discipline as a Feres rationale until Stencel
Aero and Johnson. See supra Part I.A.2.
97. See Chappell, 462 U.S. at 300.
98. See id. at 301. The Constitution grants plenary power to Congress “[t]o raise and
support Armies,” “[t]o provide and maintain a Navy,” and “[t]o make Rules for Government
and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12–14.
99. See Chappell, 462 U.S. at 302–04.
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3. United States v. Stanley: “Do Not Enter”
The Supreme Court subsequently refocused its lens and narrowed Bivens
claims even further in United States v. Stanley.100 Stanley may be the apex
of the Feres doctrine because its facts involved not just mere negligence but
gross misconduct by the military against one of its members. The claimant
in Stanley was a former service member who had unknowingly volunteered
for a program where the army secretly administered him the hallucinogenic
drug LSD to study its effects.101 Due to the LSD, the claimant began to suffer
from hallucinations, memory loss, and severe personality changes that
eventually led to his discharge from the military and dissolution of his
marriage.102 Five years after his discharge, the claimant was finally notified
that he had been secretly administered LSD and subsequently sought, but was
unsuccessful in acquiring, administrative relief.103
The claimant eventually resorted to civilian courts and filed a claim under
the FTCA against the government. The District Court for the Southern
District of Florida granted summary judgment for the government, finding
that the claimant’s injuries were incident to service and therefore not
actionable under the FTCA.104 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of
the FTCA claim, but allowed the claimant to raise a Bivens claim against the
individual military officials and civilians of the drug program by pleading a
violation of his Fifth Amendment right against deprivation of life and liberty
without due process.105
Although the district court granted partial summary judgment for the
government due to the fact that the claimant could not identify the proper
military officials to sue, the court of appeals gave the claimant an opportunity
to amend his claim to name at least one defendant.106 During the proceedings
on the claimant’s second amended complaint, the Chappell decision was
released and the district court reaffirmed its previously vacated order.107
Despite the fact that the Chappell and Bivens remedy was not available to
service members because of the deleterious effect on military good order and
discipline, the district court allowed the claimant’s Bivens claim to proceed
because it found that the special factors only applied to service members who
brought a claim against a superior officer for “direct orders in the
performance of military duty and the discipline and order necessary
thereto.”108 Moreover, the district court supported its decision by noting that
there were no congressionally prescribed remedies in place for the type of

100. 483 U.S. 669 (1987).
101. See id. at 671.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 672.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 673–74. Stanley eventually named ten civilian defendants and “unknown
individual federal and state agents and officers.” Id. at 674 n.2.
107. See id. at 675.
108. See id. (quoting Stanley v. United States, 574 F. Supp. 474, 479 (S.D. Fla. 1983)).
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egregious injuries the claimant suffered.109 The defendants sought
interlocutory appeal which the Eleventh Circuit granted.110 The court of
appeals affirmed and allowed the Bivens claim to proceed.111
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.112 The Stanley Court
applied Feres’s incident-to-service bar to the claimant’s constitutional claims
for service-related injuries.113 In the majority opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia
noted that “[a] test for liability that depends on the extent to which particular
suits would call into question military discipline and decisionmaking would
itself require judicial inquiry into, and hence intrusion upon, military
matters.”114 The Stanley Court also found the lack of an alternative remedy
for the claimant irrelevant in determining whether the courts should intrude
upon military affairs.115 Thus, the “special factors counselling hesitation”
became less of a cautionary measure and more of a secondary line of analysis.
Due to the special factors, the Court held that both Bivens and FTCA claims
should undergo the same Feres incident-to-service analysis.116
Although all justices unanimously agreed that Stanley was not entitled to
recover under the FTCA due to the fact that his injuries were sustained
incident to service,117 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and Justice Brennan
strongly dissented118 to the Court’s decision to dismiss Stanley’s
constitutional claims to recover damages for the government subjecting
Stanley to secret, nonconsensual human experimentation while he was
serving in the U.S. Army.
Justice O’Connor emphasized that the government’s conduct went beyond
mere negligence, or even deliberate indifference, to conduct that was “so far
beyond the bounds of human decency that as a matter of law it simply cannot
be considered a part of the military mission.”119 She particularly admonished
the Court for using Chappell’s “judicially crafted” rule to “insulate
defendants from liability for deliberate and calculated exposure of otherwise
healthy military personnel to medical experimentation without their
consent . . . for no other reason than to gather information on the effect of
[LSD] on human beings.”120

109. See id.
110. Id. While this case was pending, the Fifth Circuit was divided into the Fifth Circuit
and Eleventh Circuit. See Stanley v. United States, 786 F.2d 1490, 1492–93 (11th Cir. 1986).
111. See Stanley, 483 U.S. at 675.
112. Id. at 676.
113. See id. at 681.
114. Id. at 682.
115. See id. at 683.
116. See id. at 683–84.
117. See id. at 670.
118. Justice O’Connor wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Id. at 708
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Brennan wrote a dissent
which Justice Marshall joined in full and which Justice Stevens joined in part. Id. at 686
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 709 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
120. Id.
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Further denouncing the Court’s decision regarding Stanley’s constitutional
claim, Justice Brennan reproached the Court for “disregard[ing] the
commands of our Constitution, and bow[ing] instead to the purported
requirements of a different master, military discipline.”121 Justice Brennan
further highlighted the apparent hypocrisy in the United States military’s
actions, as it had criminally prosecuted Nazi officials for experimenting on
human subjects only a few years earlier.122
Stanley finally achieved some recourse in 1994 when Congress passed
private legislation,123 which established an arbitration panel to determine
whether Stanley was entitled to damages and, if so, to determine the award
amount (up to $400,577).124 The arbitration panel voted two to one for
Stanley and awarded him the maximum amount of recovery allowed.125
Therefore, although Stanley achieved legal recourse after nearly twenty years
of legal battles, this was only possible due to Congress’s own efforts and it
can be assumed that remedy through private legislation is not a viable option
for most service members who cannot recover under Bivens.
4. The Feres Doctrine in the Courts of Appeals: A Fork in the Road
Although the Supreme Court held that service members who sustained
injuries incident to service are not entitled to recovery under the FTCA or
Bivens, the Supreme Court did not clarify how to ascertain whether an injury
arose incident to service.126 Recall that the Johnson Court laid down three
broad rationales to guide a court’s Feres inquiry, but these rationales have
proved too broad and thus difficult to apply.127 As a result, federal courts
over time have applied a case-by-case inquiry, which has led to inconsistent
applications of the Feres doctrine across various circuits.128 To sample
Feres’s inconsistencies throughout the circuit courts, this section compares
two approaches to the doctrine.
As the Fifth Circuit retraced the evolution of the Feres doctrine in Parker
v. United States,129 it noted the increasing murkiness of when an injury is
incident to service.130 To clarify the fact-based inquiry of the Feres
121. Id. at 686 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 687–88.
123. Private laws only apply to a specific individual or group of people. Public and Private
Laws, GOVINFO, https://www.govinfo.gov/help/plaw [https://perma.cc/YD2H-ZTMF] (last
updated Jan. 22, 2018).
124. Bob Erlandson, Ex-Sergeant Compensated for LSD Experiments Tests by Army, CIA
Done at Edgewood, BALT. SUN (Mar. 7, 1996), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1996-0307/news/1996067079_1_stanley-lsd-fort-knox [https://perma.cc/P3QQ-UDG2].
125. Id.
126. See Deirdre G. Brou, Alternatives to the Judicially Promulgated Feres Doctrine, 192
MIL. L. REV. 1, 25–26 (2007).
127. See, e.g., Taber v. Maine, 67 F.3d 1029, 1038–43 (2d Cir. 1995) (recounting the
inconsistences of the Feres doctrine throughout its history and noting the difficulties of
applying the doctrine).
128. See id.
129. 611 F.2d 1007 (5th Cir. 1980).
130. See id. at 1008–11.
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doctrine’s incident-to-service analysis, the Parker court articulated three
factors to determine whether the service member’s FTCA claim may
proceed: (1) the duty status of the service member, (2) the place of injury,
and (3) what activity the service member was engaged in at the time of the
injury.131 This test—known as the Parker test—has become the standard
inquiry for applying the Feres doctrine within the Fifth Circuit.132
However, variations of the Parker test also exist depending on the factual
circumstances of the service member’s claim. For example, in service
members’ medical malpractice suits, the first factor, which inquires into the
service member’s duty status, “subsumes” the third factor, which inquires
into the service member’s activity.133 The third factor then is replaced with
an inquiry into whether the service member’s medical treatment “was
intended to return him to military service.”134 Thus, although the Fifth
Circuit generally considers duty status the most critical factor of the Parker
test, the third factor is the most important factor in determining whether the
service member was injured incident to service in medical malpractice
suits.135
Unlike the Fifth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit takes a broader approach to the
Feres doctrine by only relying upon the three broad rationales articulated in
Johnson.136 The Sixth Circuit noted in Major v. United States137 that Feres
had expanded
to encompass, at a minimum, all injuries suffered by military personnel that
are even remotely related to the individual’s status as a member of the
military, without regard to the location of the event, the status (military or
civilian) of the tortfeasor, or any nexus between the injury-producing event
and the essential defense/combat purpose of the military activity from
which it arose.138

Even in subsequent cases, the Sixth Circuit has not articulated a multiplefactor test, as the Fifth Circuit has, and instead bases its decisions on other
circuit cases with similar factual inquiries to the case under consideration.139
In sum, depending on where the service member raises his or her claim,
the results might differ due to the differences in each circuit’s Feres analysis.
While some circuits may consider the duty status of the service member as
the most pertinent factor in its analysis, other circuits choose to analyze the
claim in a broader context. With circuit courts differing in application of the
131. Id. at 1013.
132. See Regan v. Starcraft Marine, LLC, 524 F.3d 627, 637 (5th Cir. 2008).
133. Snell v. Simpson, No. 09-992-BAJ-SCR, 2011 WL 13202679, at *4 (M.D. La. Sept.
2, 2011) (quoting Schoemer v. United States, 59 F.3d 26, 28–29 (5th Cir. 1995)).
134. See id. at *4 (quoting Schoemer, 59 F.3d at 28–29).
135. See id. at *5.
136. See supra Part I.A.2.
137. 835 F.2d 641 (6th Cir. 1987).
138. Id. at 644–45.
139. See, e.g., Lovely v. United States, 570 F.3d 778, 783 (6th Cir. 2009); Mackey v.
United States, 226 F.3d 773, 776 (6th Cir. 2000); Skees v. United States, 107 F.3d 421, 423–
24 (6th Cir. 1997); Wright v. United States, No. 91-2404, 1992 WL 279314, at *3–4 (6th Cir.
Oct. 9, 1992) (per curiam).
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Feres doctrine, it is difficult to pinpoint the exact scope of the doctrine and
to which specific circumstances the doctrine extends.
5. Klay and Cioca: Dead End
Although various circuit courts have been inconsistent with regards to their
application of the Feres doctrine, they have achieved some consensus
regarding the unavailability of Bivens claims for service members.
During 2013 and 2014, the Fourth Circuit and D.C. Circuit heard similar
Bivens actions brought by former and current service members of various
branches of the U.S. Armed Forces who had been sexually assaulted by their
peers. Both cases, Cioca v. Rumsfeld140 and Klay v. Panetta,141 alleged that
the former Secretaries of Defense, Secretaries of the Navy, and the
Commandants of the Marines142 violated the service members’ constitutional
rights, namely their First Amendment rights of free speech, Fifth Amendment
rights of equal protection and due process, and Seventh Amendment rights
to a jury trial.143 Both cases had similar allegations: the plaintiffs suffered
undue harm from the mismanagement of their sexual assaults by the military
and government.144
Although both courts noted the plaintiffs’ suffering, both also recognized
that no Bivens remedies were available for service members whose injuries
were incident to service.145 Both courts concluded that the incident-toservice test was colored by the fact that it was inappropriate for courts to
“pass judgment on the merits of the Defendants’ military decisions, which
Supreme Court precedent has concluded is not within . . . judicial branch
function.”146 In other words, the courts did not wish to recognize an implied
cause of action and overstep separation-of-powers principles absent explicit
congressional authorization.147 The Fourth Circuit panel opined that “Bivens
suits are never permitted for constitutional violations arising from military
service, no matter how severe the injury or how egregious the rights
infringement.”148
Bivens actions are no longer an available route for service members to seek
legal recourse for sexual assault during their military careers. However,
unlike Bivens actions, which rest upon an implied cause of action, the FTCA
explicitly allows service members to recover for injuries sustained not
140. 720 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 2013).
141. 758 F.3d 369 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
142. Only Klay alleged claims against the former secretaries of the navy and commandants
of the Marine Corps. See id. at 371.
143. Both Cioca and Klay alleged violation of Fifth Amendment rights to equal protection
and due process, but only Klay alleged violation of the right to bodily integrity. Compare
Cioca, 720 F.3d at 507, with Klay, 758 F.3d at 372.
144. See Cioca, 720 F.3d at 507; see also Klay, 758 F.3d at 371–72.
145. See Cioca, 720 F.3d at 517–18; see also Klay, 758 F.3d at 377.
146. Cioca, 720 F.3d at 516; see also Klay, 758 F.3d at 375.
147. See Cioca, 720 F.3d at 516; see also Klay, 758 F.3d at 375–76.
148. Cioca, 720 F.3d at 512 (quoting ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 621–
22 (5th ed. 2007)).
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incident to their service. Thus, in theory, despite Feres, a service member
might yet prevail on a sexual assault FTCA claim so long as he or she can
establish that the injuries were not incident to service.
II. MILITARY-SERVICE ACADEMIES: WHAT DO WE DO WITH THEM?
Under § 3075(b)(2),149 cadets and professors of West Point are part of the
United States Army.150 Similar statutes cover professors, cadets, and
midshipmen enrolled at the U.S. Naval Academy (USNA) in Annapolis,
Maryland, and the U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA) in Colorado Springs,
Colorado. Since cadets and midshipmen are members of the U.S. Armed
Forces, courts do not distinguish between the military in general and MSAs
in their analysis of FTCA claims brought by cadets or midshipmen of MSAs,
including in their application of the Feres doctrine.
Before proceeding with how MSAs are analyzed under Feres, it is
important to lay out the basic characteristics of MSAs. MSAs are
quintessentially different than the active-duty branches of the military and in
certain ways are more akin to civilian colleges than the military at large. For
example, all three MSAs are accredited universities151 that grant cadets and
midshipmen bachelor’s degrees upon graduation.152 All three MSAs offer
similar academic programs, with more than twenty majors ranging from
science and engineering to humanities.153 Similar to other institutions of
higher learning, the MSAs also offer various extracurricular activities such
as clubs and athletic teams for cadets and midshipmen to participate in during
their four years at the academies.154 And, as a practical matter, the three
149. 10 U.S.C. § 3075(b)(2) (2012).
150. 6 C.J.S. Armed Services § 28 (2018).
151. West Point and the Naval Academy are accredited by the Middle States Commission
on Higher Education while the Air Force Academy is accredited by the Higher Learning
Commission. See Accreditation, U.S. NAVAL ACAD., https://www.usna.edu/Academics/
Academic-Dean/Accreditation.php [https://perma.cc/TE3V-YFRM] (last visited Oct. 4,
2018);
Graduating
from
the
Academy:
Curriculum,
U.S.A.F.
ACAD.,
https://www.usafa.edu/academics/registrar/curriculum/ [https://perma.cc/Z6V4-MZPL] (last
visited Oct. 4, 2018); Welcome to the Office of the Dean, U.S. MIL. ACAD.,
https://www.usma.edu/academics/SitePages/Home.aspx
[https://perma.cc/5HH4-WXXG]
(last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
152. See About USNA, U.S. NAVAL ACAD., https://www.usna.edu/About/index.php
[https://perma.cc/W2X5-7FEF] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018); About West Point, U.S. MIL. ACAD.,
https://www.westpoint.edu/About/SitePages/Home.aspx [https://perma.cc/J5KB-RR8F] (last
visited Oct. 4, 2018); Graduating from the Academy: Curriculum, supra note 151.
153. See Academics, U.S. NAVAL ACAD., https://www.usna.edu/Academics/Majors-andCourses/index.php [https://perma.cc/X6JK-TG2G] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018); Academics at a
Different Altitude, U.S.A.F. ACAD., https://www.usafa.edu/academics/ [https://perma.cc/
6U4D-UAVU] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018); Curriculum, U.S. MIL. ACAD.,
https://www.westpoint.edu/curriculum/SitePages/Home.aspx [https://perma.cc/8Y8G-UFG5]
(last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
154. See Midshipman Interests, U.S. NAVAL ACAD., https://www.usna.edu/MidActivities/
[https://perma.cc/8JUT-V6E8] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018); Welcome to the Directorate of Cadet
Activities, U.S. MIL. ACAD., https://www.westpoint.edu/dca/SitePages/Home.aspx
[https://perma.cc/72G9-F2UC] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018); What Life Is Like at the Academy’s
Altitude,
U.S.A.F.
ACAD.,
https://www.usafa.edu/cadet-life/
[https://perma.cc/
SY2F-TU6D] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
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traditional MSAs compete for blue-chip students with elite civilian colleges,
and they in fact advertise themselves as a reasonable, free option for a highquality college education comparable to the civilian institutions.155
However, MSAs differ from civilian institutions of higher learning in
certain respects.156 Unlike students at civilian universities, cadets and
midshipmen are required by law to serve for at least five years as active-duty
commissioned officers of the military upon graduation.157 However, the
service obligation does not vest until after the second year of studies at an
MSA is completed.158 To prepare the cadets and midshipmen for their roles
as officers of the U.S. Armed Forces, all MSAs incorporate military and
physical training into their curricula alongside their academic programs.159
Hence, unlike civilian university students, cadets and midshipmen follow a
strict daily schedule that requires all cadets and midshipmen to wake up, eat,
learn, and train during the same regimented hours.160 In addition to the strict
military and physical training regimens during the academic year, cadets and
midshipmen are required to participate in military training for a few weeks
during the summer between each academic year.161 Thus, MSAs not only
purport to offer top-quality university education for their cadets and
midshipmen, but their required military training and education component
differentiates them from other civilian institutions and resembles the activeduty branches of the military. In effect, the cadets and midshipmen of MSAs
occupy a gray area: they are simultaneously fledgling active-duty officers of
155. USMA
Admissions—the
Corps
Starts
Here!,
U.S. MIL. ACAD.,
https://www.westpoint.edu/admissions/SitePages/Home.aspx
[https://perma.cc/THN2R5FX] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
156. This denotes other state-run military higher-education institutions such as senior
military colleges (e.g., Virginia Military Institute) that are civilian colleges that require all its
students to enroll in a Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) program. See Military Colleges
and Academies, USA.GOV, https://www.usa.gov/military-colleges [https://perma.cc/S3B7THQB] (last updated Mar. 13, 2018); Service Academies & Senior Military Colleges,
TODAY’S MIL., https://todaysmilitary.com/training/service-academies-and-military-colleges
[https://perma.cc/AFB6-8HY3] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
157. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 4348(a)(2)(A)–(B), 6959(a)(2)(A)–(B), 9348(a)(2)(A)–(B) (2012).
158. Doe v. Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d. 36, 51 (2d Cir. 2017) (Chin, J., dissenting).
159. See Academics, supra note 153; Applying to College Is a Big Step, U.S. MIL. ACAD.,
https://www.westpoint.edu/admissions/SitePages/Pros_Cadets.aspx [https://perma.cc/NJD3AYFX] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018); Military Education, U.S.A.F. ACAD.,
https://www.usafa.edu/cadet-life/military/military-education/
[https://perma.cc/54LYBEDU] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
160. See A Day in the Life, U.S.A.F. ACAD., https://www.usafa.edu/cadet-life/day-in-thelife/ [https://perma.cc/7H5D-N5KS] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018); Cadet Life, ARMY W. POINT,
http://goarmywestpoint.com/sports/2015/7/14/gameday_0714153634.aspx?prl=6357247063
63055257 [https://perma.cc/NEB5-8J2S] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018); Daily Schedule, U.S.
NAVAL
ACAD.,
https://www.usna.edu/Admissions/Student-Life/Daily-Schedule.php
[https://perma.cc/AJF9-Z5HG] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
161. See Cadet Schedule, U.S.A.F. ACAD., http://usafa.smartcatalogiq.com/en/20152016/Catalog/Cadet-Life/Cadet-Schedule [https://perma.cc/M2FU-GY6F] (last visited Oct. 4,
2018); Cadet Summer Training (CST), U.S. MIL. ACAD., https://www.westpoint.edu/
dmi/SitePages/Cadet%20Summer%20Training%20(CST).aspx
[https://perma.cc/M89GS8MJ] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018); Summer at USNA, U.S. NAVAL ACAD.,
https://www.usna.edu/Admissions/Academics/Summer-At-USNA.php
[https://perma.cc/
HQS7-4V8V] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
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the U.S. Armed Forces and also students at accredited universities pursuing
college degrees.
Because these institutions operate both as educational and military
establishments, it is important to understand how both types of
establishments are regulated. First, Part II.A discusses how educational
institutions are evaluated under Title IX for issues relating to gender
discrimination and sexual assault. Part II.B then discusses how a
hypothetical claim would be resolved if MSAs were subject to Title IX.
A. Educational Institutions and Title IX
For educational institutions receiving federal funding, Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972162 (“Title IX”) prohibits gender
discrimination in the institutions’ programs and activities.163 Title IX
provides exceptions ranging from educational institutions of religious
organizations to social fraternities and sororities in institutions of higher
learning.164 In § 1681(a)(4), Title IX specifically excludes all institutions
whose primary purpose is to train individuals for U.S. military service.165
Hence, even though MSAs are federally funded institutions of higher
learning, these institutions can discriminate based upon gender under Title
IX, and cadets and midshipmen cannot pursue claims under Title IX for
injuries sustained from gender discrimination at the MSAs.
B. Title IX Basics
To understand how civilian students’ remedies for sexual assault under
Title IX differ from the remedies cadets and midshipmen of MSAs can
pursue under the FTCA, it is first important to understand how Title IX
operates and what factors are considered in order to hold schools liable for
gender discrimination under this statute. Parts II.B.1 and II.B.2 examine
how, under Title IX, schools may be held liable for damages for schoolemployee-on-student harassment, while Parts II.B.3 and II.B.4 discuss how
Title IX may be applied to hold schools, including higher-education
institutions, liable for student-on-student harassment that occurred on school
grounds.

162. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012). Section 1681(a) states: “No person in the United States
shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.” Section 1681(c) defines educational institutions as
any public or private preschool, elementary, or secondary school, or any institution
of vocational, professional, or higher education, except that in the case of an
educational institution composed of more than one school, college, or department
which are administratively separate units, such term means each such school,
college, or department.
163. Id. § 1681; see also 14 C.J.S. Civil Rights § 165 (2018).
164. For more exceptions contained in Title IX, see 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1)–(9).
165. Id. § 1681(a)(4).
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1. Cannon v. University of Chicago: Implied Causes of Action
Although MSAs are not covered under Title IX, it is important to
understand how other similar educational institutions are analyzed under
Title IX for claims brought by students for sexual assault.
Soon after Title IX was enacted, the Supreme Court in Cannon v.
University of Chicago166 faced the issue of whether individuals had a private
cause of action against universities under Title IX, even though the statute
did not explicitly provide for one.167 To determine whether Congress
intended an implied cause of action under Title IX, the Court focused on a
similarly worded statute, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.168 By
finding that Title VI provided an implied cause of action for individuals who
had been discriminated against based upon race, color, or national origin, the
Court found that Congress likely intended the same under Title IX for gender
discrimination.169 Moreover, since the statutes utilized identical language
focusing on the benefitted class rather than language prohibiting racial or
gender discrimination in federally assisted programs, the Court inferred that
Congress also intended to provide a cause of action for the benefitted class
under Title IX.170
It is important to note two factors the Court considered in addition to the
language indicating an implied cause of action. First, the Court inferred that
Congress did not intend to endorse the use of public funds to financially
support educational institutions engaged in discriminatory practices.171
Second, the Court noted that recognizing a private cause of action under Title
IX would not overburden universities.172 Specifically, the Court pointed out
that Title VI had not produced litigation “so costly or voluminous that either
the academic community or the courts have been unduly burdened.”173
Furthermore, the Court found that recognizing Title IX actions would not
result in university administrators being “so concerned about the risk of
litigation” so as to “fail to discharge their important responsibilities in . . . [a]
professional manner.”174 In sum, the Court found not only that the implied
cause of action under Title IX provided a necessary remedy for individuals
who were injured by gender discrimination, but also noted that university
administrations were fully capable of handling any Title IX litigation.

166. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
167. Id. at 683.
168. See id. at 694–98. Title VI states: “No person in the United States shall, on the ground
of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012).
169. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 690.
170. See id. at 690–93.
171. See id. at 692–93, 704.
172. See id. at 709–10.
173. Id. at 709.
174. Id. at 710.
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2. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools:
Awarding Damages Under Title IX
Following Cannon’s recognition of an implied cause of action under Title
IX, the Supreme Court in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools175 held
that damages were an available remedy under Title IX.176 The Court
reasoned that since Congress had not expressly stated that monetary damages
were unavailable under Title IX, the Court retained the power to allow for
any appropriate relief.177
The claimant in Franklin was a student who was repeatedly sexually
harassed and assaulted by the school’s sports coach.178 When the student
notified the school’s administrators and asked them to address the situation,
the school did not pursue any actions against the coach and attempted to
discourage the student from pressing charges against him.179 Along with its
holding that damages were available under Title IX, the Court also confirmed
that the school district had a duty under Title IX to ensure that its staff did
not discriminate based on sex.180 Namely, the school district had a duty to
ensure that its staff were not engaging in sexual harassment—a type of
gender discrimination.181
Similar to the separation-of-powers concerns discussed in Feres and
Bivens, the Court was once again faced with the question whether allowing
damages as a remedy for Title IX would result in an undue expansion of
judicial power.182 The Court answered this inquiry in the negative, focusing
on the difference between finding a cause of action and its power to
determine appropriate remedies.183 In particular, the Court argued that
refusing to allow for damages would render any causes of action authorized
(explicitly or implicitly) by Congress useless and result in greater harm to
separation-of-power principles than “selective abdication” of the Court’s
judicial authority.184 In particular, the Court emphasized, “From the earliest
years of the Republic, the Court has recognized the power of the Judiciary to
award appropriate remedies to redress injuries actionable in federal
court . . . .”185

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

503 U.S. 60 (1992).
Id. at 76.
See id. at 70–71.
See id. at 63.
See id. at 64.
See id. at 75.
See id. (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986)).
See id. at 73.
See id. at 73–74.
See id. at 74.
Id. at 66.
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3. Gebser and Davis: Deliberate Indifference and School Duties
Regarding Student-on-Student Sexual Harassment
Since the Supreme Court allowed individuals to recover damages against
school administrations under Title IX, the Court had to further define to what
extent the administration could be held liable. In Gebser v. Lago Vista
Independent School District,186 the Court set the standard of care required
for school administrators under Title IX by holding that schools can be held
liable if the school, with knowledge of the acts of sexual harassment by its
staff, had acted with “deliberate[] indifferen[ce].”187
The Supreme Court further clarified Gebser’s “deliberate indifference”
language in the context of student-on-student sexual harassment in Davis v.
Monroe County Board of Education.188 The Davis Court laid out a
framework to be satisfied in order to find schools liable for student-onstudent harassment.189 Within this framework, the Court held that a federally
funded school is liable only when (1) the alleged harassment was “so severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively bars the victim’s
access to an educational opportunity or benefit,” and (2) with knowledge of
this harassment, the school acted with deliberate indifference.190
The Davis Court further explained that the “deliberate indifference” must
have at least caused or exposed the student to the alleged sexual
harassment.191 Moreover, in the context of student-on-student harassment,
schools satisfy the “deliberate indifference” requirement when their response
“or lack thereof is clearly unreasonable in light of the known
circumstances.”192 The Davis Court also limited a school’s scope of liability
to situations where the school had considerable control, not only over the
student-harasser, but also the context in which the harassment occurred.193
Thus, the Davis Court ensured that schools that acted reasonably in response
to the alleged harassment would not be held liable for student-on-student
harassment, at least to the extent over which the school had control.
4. Williams v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia:
Applying Title IX to Sexual Harassment at Universities
The Supreme Court articulated the “deliberate indifference” standard of
liability for teacher-on-student harassment in Gebser and adopted the same
standard in Davis for student-on-student harassment. Later, in 2007, the
Eleventh Circuit applied this Title IX analysis in Williams v. Board of

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

524 U.S. 274 (1998).
See id. at 277.
526 U.S. 629 (1999).
See id. at 633.
Id.
See id. at 644–45.
See id. at 648.
See id. at 645.
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Regents of the University System of Georgia194 to alleged sexual assault in
the university context.
The plaintiff, Tiffany Williams, was a student at the University of Georgia
(“UGA”) who was sexually assaulted by three student-athletes.195 Although
the plaintiff agreed to consensual sex with the first perpetrator, Tony Cole,
she was not aware that Cole allowed his friend, Brandon Williams, to wait in
the closet to rape the plaintiff after Cole.196 While Brandon Williams was
assaulting the plaintiff, Cole called another friend, Steven Thomas, telling
him they were “running a train” on the plaintiff.197 Cole invited Thomas to
his room and Thomas proceeded to rape the plaintiff after Brandon
Williams.198 The three perpetrators were charged criminally and under the
university’s judiciary panel. Yet, all three were either acquitted or not
disciplined.199
The plaintiff eventually brought Title IX claims against UGA, the Board
of Regents of UGA, and the University of Georgia Athletic Association
(UGAA).200 The district court ultimately dismissed all claims and the
plaintiff appealed.201
In evaluating whether UGA and UGAA were in violation of Title IX and
liable for student-on-student harassment, the Eleventh Circuit outlined four
elements discussed in Gebser and Davis. The court concluded that the
plaintiff must establish that: (1) the institutional defendants are federalfunding recipients; (2) the defendants had actual knowledge of the alleged
harassment; (3) the defendants acted with “deliberate indifference” that
“subjected” the plaintiff to discrimination; and (4) the discrimination was “so
severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effectively bars the
victim’s access to an educational opportunity or benefit.”202
The facts of the case eventually showed that the plaintiff’s Title IX claims
should not have been dismissed. After the first element was established, the
Eleventh Circuit found that UGA and UGAA had actual knowledge of the
harassment.203 Not only had UGA and UGAA recruited Cole into their
athletic department knowing that he had sexually assaulted other women at
the University of Rhode Island and had been charged with sexual misconduct

194. 477 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2007).
195. See id. at 1288.
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See id. at 1289.
200. The plaintiff brought four claims against the individual rapists, UGA and its board of
regents, and the UGAA. For the purposes of this Note, only the Title IX claim against UGA
and UGAA are relevant and will be discussed. Id. at 1290.
201. See id. at 1290–91. The Eleventh Circuit found that the Title IX claim against the
board of regents was properly dismissed. Id. at 1293–94.
202. See id. at 1293 (quoting Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999)).
203. See id. at 1294. As discussed previously, sexual harassment is considered a form of
gender discrimination. See supra Part II.A.2.
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at Wabash Valley College,204 but they were also aware of the rape of the
plaintiff by the three defendants.205
Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit found that the plaintiff had satisfied both
the third and fourth elements. Although the UGA police had provided a
preliminary report within forty-eight hours of the incident and a full report
within three months of the incident, UGA acted with “deliberate
indifference” when it waited eight months to bring any disciplinary hearings
against the defendants.206 Furthermore, UGA and UGAA, with full
knowledge of Cole’s record, did not adequately ensure that the studentathletes were informed of the sexual harassment policy, and their failure to
“supervise its student-athletes subjected Williams to this further harassment
and caused Williams to be the victim of a conspiracy between Cole, Brandon
Williams, and Thomas to sexually assault and rape her.”207
Due to UGA and UGAA’s “deliberate indifference,” the court reasoned,
the university’s discriminatory actions effectively barred her from continuing
her education at UGA.208 Although the plaintiff withdrew from UGA after
the incident, UGA failed to take any actions against the three defendants that
would have prevented them from attacking the plaintiff if she had chosen to
return to continue her education at UGA.209
While the Davis Court recognized that discrimination must “be more
widespread than a single instance of one-on-one peer harassment,” the
Eleventh Circuit found that the plaintiff had satisfied this element.210 Given
the allegations that the defendants conspired a serial group rape of the
plaintiff spanning two hours, the Court found that the severity of this series
of events was objectively offensive.
In sum, the Eleventh Circuit found that UGA and UGAA were liable
because they had knowledge of the fact that Cole was a known predator and,
with this knowledge, failed to supervise him. For the other two studentathletes, the administrators also failed to provide adequate education of the
athletic program’s sexual harassment policy. In light of these factors, the
Eleventh Circuit held UGA and UGAA liable for the student-athletes’ rape
of the plaintiff and awarded her Title IX damages.
III. HOW MSA CONDUCT WOULD FARE UNDER A DIFFERENT STANDARD
Title IX effectively provides relief for individuals seeking to bring actions
against educational institutions receiving federal funding. It is clear that
MSAs are exempt under Title IX. But should they be allowed this leeway?
As discussed previously, when a cadet or midshipman brings a tort or
204. See id. at 1290.
205. See id. at 1294.
206. See id. at 1296–97.
207. Id. at 1296.
208. See id. at 1298.
209. See id.
210. See id. at 1297–98 (quoting Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 652–
53 (1999)).
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constitutional claim against the United States, the Feres doctrine will apply
and courts will determine whether the injury that arose was “incident to
service.” However, Title IX seems to provide a fairer and more just result
for students who choose to pursue claims against school administrations
regarding student-on-student sexual assault. Amending Title IX to allow
cadets or midshipmen to recover would pave the way for achieving justice
for individuals facing these issues at MSAs.
By considering the facts of Doe v. Hagenbeck,211 summarized in the
Introduction to this Note, this Part first delves into the Southern District of
New York’s Feres analysis of Jane Doe’s claim and the outcome of Doe’s
claim on appeal in the Second Circuit. This Part then analyzes the facts of
Doe under Title IX to see how Doe’s claim may have fared if she were a
student in a federally funded civilian higher-education institution, instead of
West Point.
A. The Application of Feres to Military-Service Academies
In April 2013, Jane Doe filed a complaint in the District Court for the
Southern District of New York against the United States, Lieutenant General
Franklin Lee Hagenbeck (then the superintendent of West Point and chair of
West Point’s Sexual Assault Review Board), and Brigadier General William
E. Rapp (then the commandant of cadets and in charge of cadet training and
administration at West Point). Doe brought four causes of action: (1) a
Bivens claim against individual defendants for due process violations under
the Fifth Amendment; (2) a Bivens claim against individual defendants for
equal protection violations under the Fifth Amendment; (3) a claim against
the United States for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
under the “Little Tucker Act”;212 and (4) an FTCA claim against the United
States for negligence, negligent supervision and training, negligent infliction
of emotional distress, and abuse of process.213 Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein
dismissed all but the second equal protection Bivens claim,214 permitting it
to proceed on the ground that Doe’s complaint did not “take issue with the
‘military disciplining structure’”215 and therefore did not implicate the two
main judicial concerns for prohibiting Bivens claims: “the need to preserve
the military disciplinary structure and prevent judicial involvement in
sensitive military matters.”216 Or, as Judge Hellerstein put it, “All she asks

211. 98 F. Supp. 3d 672 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), rev’d in part, 870 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2017).
212. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (2012).
213. See Doe v. Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d 36, 40–41 (2d Cir. 2017).
214. That Judge Hellerstein’s dismissal of Jane Doe’s FTCA claim was based on an
exception provided for in § 2680(a) goes beyond the scope of this Note. Other circuit courts
who have decided FTCA claims brought by cadets and midshipmen have used the Feres
doctrine to dismiss FTCA claims. See generally, e.g., Ruggiero v. United States, 162 F. App’x
140 (3d Cir. 2006); Cummings v. Dep’t of Navy, 279 F.3d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Wake v.
United States, 89 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 1996); Collins v. United States, 642 F.2d 217 (7th Cir.
1981); Morse v. West, 975 F. Supp. 1379 (D. Colo. 1997).
215. Hagenbeck, 98 F. Supp. 3d at 688 (quoting Wake, 89 F.3d at 57).
216. Id. (quoting Wake, 89. F.3d at 57).
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for is the dignity of equality—that there be no special rules, or practices, at
West Point that favor male cadets over female cadets, or vice-versa, or that
tend to degrade one sex as a means to raise or motivate another.”217 Thus,
Judge Hellerstein found that Jane Doe’s Bivens claim was not barred under
the Feres doctrine.218 The defendants filed for an interlocutory appeal, and
the Second Circuit granted defendants’ motion.219
Nevertheless, a three-judge panel of the Second Circuit ultimately reversed
Judge Hellerstein’s order by two to one, holding that Doe was a cadet at West
Point and therefore a service member of the Army, which implicates the
Feres doctrine and “special factors counseling hesitation.”220 Judge Debra
Ann Livingston concluded that “[a]djudicating the claim she brings against
her superior officers . . . would require a civilian court to examine a host of
military decisions regarding aspects of West Point’s culture, . . . the
supervision of West Point cadets, their training and education, and their
discipline by superior officers.”221 In the view of the majority, West Point’s
primary mission, to train future officers of the U.S. Armed Forces, signified
that the college component of the MSA was inseverable from the militarytraining component of the institution.222 Therefore, Doe’s claim against the
West Point administrators for discrimination she, and other women, faced on
campus implicated military good order and discipline.223 As in Cioca and
Klay, the Second Circuit barred Bivens claims by cadets who sought to
recover damages against MSA administrators and the government for sexual
assault.224
On the other hand, Judge Denny Chin dissented and argued that Doe’s rape
was not an injury incident to service, rather, her “injuries were incident only
to her status as a student.”225 Judge Chin highlighted the fact that Doe’s
Bivens claim is not that of a service member, which might implicate military
good order and discipline, but that of a student who “seeks recourse for
injuries caused by purported failures on the part of school administrators
acting in academic capacity overseeing a learning environment for
students.”226 Furthermore, Judge Chin contended that although other cases
such as Klay and Cioca had effectively closed off remedies for service
members for sexual assault, Doe’s case was markedly different since her
claim did not intrude upon the policies of high-ranking military officials.227
Rather, the heart of Doe’s claim was whether she was “depriv[ed] of
meaningful access to an education because of discriminatory academic
policies or school administrators tasked with running an educational
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id.
Id. at 689.
See Doe v. Hagenbeck, 870 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 2017).
See id. at 49.
Id. (citations omitted).
See id. at 48–49.
See id. at 49.
See id.
Id. at 51 (Chin, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 61.
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institution.”228 In other words, Judge Chin’s dissent focused on the fact that
Doe’s injuries were sustained “incident to being a student,” while the
majority’s analysis was more akin to Klay and Cioca as Doe’s injuries were
found to be incident to service.229
B. If Military-Service Academies Were Under Title IX
As discussed in Part II and in Judge Chin’s Hagenbeck dissent,230 cadets
and midshipmen occupy a gray area in the law due to the fact that they are
considered both university students and service members. This section
examines how a court may analyze a potential claim against MSAs, if the
cadets and midshipmen were alternatively categorized as students under Title
IX. For this line of analysis, Hagenbeck’s facts will be used to determine
whether she would have had an actionable claim under Title IX.
As stated previously, to determine whether a federally funded educational
institution is liable for student-on-student harassment under Title IX, the
Supreme Court mainly focuses on two factors in its test.231 Williams
extended this analysis to higher-education institutions for sexual assault
claims under Title IX.232
After establishing that the institution is federally funded, the first factor of
the Supreme Court’s Title IX analysis requires that the harassment was
severe enough to bar a student from an educational benefit.233 In Jane Doe’s
case, articulated above,234 Smith’s sexual assault and the subsequent actions,
or inaction, by the West Point administration may qualify as discrimination
severe enough to have barred Doe from continuing her education at West
Point.235 Even if the sexual assault was considered a one-time incident, a
court may also find that persistent sexual harassment and gender
discrimination from the sexually explicit taunts, degrading comments about
sex by superiors, and humiliating and discriminatory treatment by both
superiors and fellow cadets, are “severe” and persistent enough to bar Doe
from an educational benefit.
Assuming that there is a fair likelihood that the first factor could be
satisfied, Jane Doe would also likely satisfy the second factor of the Supreme
Court’s Title IX analysis: deliberate indifference.236 West Point had full
228. Id.
229. Compare id. at 62, with id. at 49 (majority opinion).
230. See supra Part II.B.
231. The first factor refers to the harassment itself: the discrimination, which includes the
harassment and the subsequent events that occurred in relation to the incident, must be “so
severe” as to bar the student from an educational benefit; it cannot be trivial. The second
factor focused on the actions of the school: whether the school had knowledge of the
harassment and whether, with the knowledge of such actions, it acted “clearly unreasonabl[y]”
or with “deliberate indifference” in response to the situation at hand. See Williams v. Bd. of
Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 447 F.3d 1282, 1297–98 (11th Cir. 2007).
232. See supra Part II.B.4.
233. See supra Part II.C.
234. See supra Part III.A.
235. See supra Part II.D.
236. See supra Part II.C.
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knowledge of Doe’s rape since Doe received treatment at West Point’s
medical facility and also filed a restricted report with the school. Although
it may be disputed whether West Point acted “clearly unreasonabl[y]” in
response to the rape, the nurse’s failure to collect evidence and West Point’s
sexual assault counselor’s lack of communication might present judges with
substantial facts to find in her favor.
Even if Doe’s post-sexual-assault treatment fails to satisfy the “deliberate
indifference” requirement, West Point’s consecutive failure to address the
rampant sexual harassment and discrimination in its policies and practices
may satisfy the requirement. West Point administrators were not only aware
of the multiple complaints female cadets had made about inappropriate
treatment by their peers, but some of its own faculty participated in such
harassment. To this extent, Doe would possibly be able to hold West Point
administrators liable not only for student-on-student harassment,237 but also
under traditional Title IX provisions of school employee-on-student
harassment.238 Since the standards for evaluating direct harassment by
school employees are less stringent than student-on-student liability, Doe
may have an opportunity to succeed through this route.
However, more important than whether or not Jane Doe would succeed in
holding West Point liable under Title IX, she would certainly have had
sufficient evidence to proceed past the dismissal stage under Title IX. By
comparing Jane Doe’s potential Title IX claim and the actual results of her
claims under the Feres doctrine, it is clear that cadets and midshipmen at
MSAs are not given the same opportunity for legal recourse as similarly
situated students at civilian universities.
As this hypothetical MSA-Title IX analysis demonstrates, other options
exist to more effectively address the needs of cadets and midshipmen. Part
IV discusses legal arguments and policy considerations that the Feres
doctrine presents in real-life situations.
IV. ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE FERES DOCTRINE
The Feres doctrine has not been without controversy over the nearly
seventy years since the Supreme Court created it. Most notable, perhaps, is
Justice Scalia’s scathing dissent in Johnson, where he claimed, “Feres was
wrongly decided and heartily deserves the ‘widespread, almost universal
criticism’ it has received.”239 Justice Scalia is not alone in his criticism. The
Third Circuit once commented, “It is because Feres too often produces such
curious results that members of this court repeatedly have expressed
misgivings about it.”240 The Ninth Circuit raised similar concerns: “We
reach this conclusion only reluctantly, bound by circuit precedent to apply
237. See supra Part II.B.3.
238. See supra Part II.B.2.
239. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 700–01 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting
In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), appeal
dismissed, 745 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1984)).
240. Richards v. United States, 176 F.3d 652, 657 (3d Cir. 1999).
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this doctrine to yet another case that seems far removed from its original
purposes.”241 One judge has even argued that the Feres doctrine is a
violation of service members’ equal protection rights and constitutional
separation-of-powers principles.242 These are but a few of the numerous
criticisms the Feres doctrine has amassed over the years.243
Part IV.A discusses legal arguments posited by judges contesting the
applicability of the Feres doctrine. Part IV.B reviews the policy arguments
that call for reconsideration of the Feres doctrine and analyzes the real-life
impact the doctrine has in today’s society.
A. Legal Arguments Against the Feres Doctrine
Johnson solidified the three broad rationales in the Feres doctrine and
further expanded the scope of Feres.244 However, the Johnson decision was
split five to four, with Justice Scalia composing the dissent for Justices
Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, and John Paul Stevens. In his dissent, Justice
Scalia attacked the three broad rationales of Feres, claiming that the
judicially made doctrine had “outlived [its] textual support, and the Feres
rule is now sustained only by three disembodied estimations of what
Congress must (despite what it enacted) have intended.”245
Justice Scalia first addressed the three factors which formed the basis of
Feres. The first reason for the Supreme Court’s holding in Feres was that
parallel private liability for service members to bring suit against the
government did not exist as required in the text of the FTCA.246 However,
if Congress intended this factor to preclude a service member from bringing
FTCA claims, then several of the exceptions under the FTCA, such as those
articulated in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b), § 2680(c), § 2680(f), and § 2680(i), were
“superfluous” since the exceptions do not also have parallel private
liability.247 In particular, Justice Scalia noted that “private individuals
typically do not, for example, transmit postal matter, collect taxes or custom
duties, impose quarantines, or regulate the monetary system.”248 Since these
specific exceptions did not also have parallel private liability, Justice Scalia
reasoned that such applications of the Feres doctrine were not intended by
Congress.
Moreover, Justice Scalia found Feres’s second rationale of “federal
relationship” lacking as well. Feres originally concluded that Congress did
not intend for state tort law to govern a “‘distinctively federal’ relationship”
241. Costo v. United States, 248 F.3d 863, 864 (9th Cir. 2001).
242. See id. at 869–76 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
243. For more examples of such criticisms of the Feres doctrine, see generally Brou, supra
note 126; Tomes, supra note 77; and Dallis N. Warshaw, The Irrational Rationale: How the
Military Hides Behind the Feres Doctrine to Deny Justice to Service Members, 59 ORANGE
COUNTY LAW., July 2017, at 28.
244. See supra Part I.A.2.
245. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 695 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
246. See id. at 694.
247. See id. at 694–95.
248. See id. at 694 (citations omitted).
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between a service member and the government.249 If Congress had not
intended for state tort law to govern recovery under the FTCA due to the
unfairness of applying a law to a service member who does not have a choice
in his geographic location, this reasoning was defeated when the Court
allowed federal prisoners, who are under similar geographic circumstances,
to recover damages against prison authorities under the FTCA.250 In other
words, if unfairness is the key underlying factor, then it is more unfair to
disallow claims due to “nonuniform recovery” than to allow “uniform
nonrecovery.”251
Further, the Feres Court reasoned that the military requires uniform
recovery.252 However, this rationale also falls short. On the one hand, the
Court has allowed service members to recover for injuries not incident to
their service and, on the other hand, has allowed civilians to recover for
negligence by service members. In other words, the Court’s own holdings
have effectively rendered the uniformity reasoning defunct.253
Lastly, the Feres Court reasoned that Congress had not intended for
service members to receive double recovery under both the FTCA and
Veteran Benefits Act for injuries or death incident to service.254 However,
in Brooks and United States v. Brown255—both cases which have not been
overruled by the Supreme Court—the Court found that the VBA was not an
“exclusive” remedy.256 Furthermore, Justice Scalia found that recovery
under the FTCA is actually not comparable to the VBA. Although the Feres
Court found that the VBA was comparable to state workers compensation
statutes, Justice Scalia noted it was easier to recover and terminate recovery
under the VBA than state workers compensation schemes and the VBA did
not exclude injuries “incident to service,” unlike the FTCA.257
However, since the Supreme Court later held that the rationales
contemplated in Feres and discussed above were “no longer controlling,”258
the most pertinent rationale was the judiciary’s interference in military good
order and discipline and decision-making. In response to this rationale,
Justice Scalia commented that it was “outlandish to consider that result
‘outlandish,’ since in fact it occurs frequently, even under the Feres
dispensation.”259 According to Justice Scalia, service members who
sustained an injury from another service member’s negligence compared to
civilians who sustained the same injury at the hand of the same service
member, under the same set of circumstances, require the same type of
249. See id. (quoting Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 143 (1950)).
250. See id. at 696 (discussing United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 162 (1963)).
251. See id. at 695–96.
252. See id. at 689.
253. See id. at 696.
254. See supra Part I.A.1.
255. 348 U.S. 110 (1954).
256. See Johnson, 481 U.S. at 698 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
257. See id.
258. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
259. See Johnson, 481 U.S. at 700 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting Brooks
v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 53 (1949)).
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inquiries and interference with military decision-making.260 However, in this
particular circumstance, only the service member’s recovery would be barred
under the Feres doctrine while the courts will still “interfere” in military
policies and decision-making for the civilian’s FTCA claim. Thus, the most
critical rationale, interference in military decision-making, does not actually
carry out its purpose, and, as Justice Scalia plainly stated, “neither the three
original Feres reasons nor the post hoc rationalization of ‘military discipline’
justifies [the Court’s] failure to apply the FTCA as written.”261 Accordingly,
Justice Scalia’s analysis highlights the logical inconsistencies of the Feres
doctrine and suggests that the judicially created Feres doctrine at least
requires thorough reconsideration.
B. Policy Arguments Against the Feres Doctrine
Several policy considerations also call for caution in expanding the Feres
doctrine to apply to MSAs, specifically in cases brought by cadets and
midshipmen for administrative mismanagement of sexual assault.
One of the primary stated goals of MSAs is to produce outstanding and
capable future leaders of the military.262 In addition to producing leaders,
the MSAs are top-ranking educational institutions263 that attract many young
men and women who aspire not only to serve their country, but also to pursue
a high-quality education. Yet, the real-life negative consequences of the
Feres doctrine diminish the effectiveness of MSAs in producing capable
future leaders of the military and in recruiting the very best applicants who
might be considering other elite civilian colleges. This Part addresses the
issues surrounding how MSAs currently address sexual assault and how the
Feres doctrine exacerbates the mismanagement that occurs when MSAs
handle sexual assaults under current doctrine.
1. Retaliation and Military-Service Academies
According to the Department of Defense’s annual report on MSAs, around
50 percent of female cadets and midshipmen who filed sexual assault reports
described experiencing retaliation in the form of ostracism and

260. See id.
261. See id.
262. See About USNA, supra note 152 (“As the undergraduate college of our country’s
naval service, the Naval Academy prepares young men and women to become professional
officers of competence, character, and compassion in the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps.”);
About West Point, supra note 152 (“West Point’s purpose is to produce leaders of character
who are prepared to provide selfless service to our Army and the nation.”); Preparing Leaders
of Character in Service to Our Country, U.S.A.F. ACAD., https://www.usafa.edu/character/
[https://perma.cc/PTP9-KMB4] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018) (“The Academy’s mission is ‘to
educate, train and inspire men and women to become officers of character motivated to lead
the United States Air Force in service to our Nation.’”).
263. Among national liberal arts colleges, the U.S. News ranked West Point eighteenth, the
U.S. Naval Academy twenty-second, and the U.S. Air Force Academy thirtieth. See National
Liberal Arts Colleges, U.S. NEWS, https://www.usnews.com/best-colleges/rankings/nationalliberal-arts-colleges (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
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maltreatment.264 Moreover, around 13 percent of these women reported
experiencing some form of professional reprisal.265 Interestingly, much of
the retaliation these cadets and midshipmen experienced is not considered
retaliation under military policy and military law.266 Even though MSAs
have been implementing policies to prohibit retaliation against victims who
report their assaults, each school, astonishingly, only received one retaliation
allegation from 2015 through 2016.267
The statistics provided by this annual report paint a general picture of the
hostile climate the cadets and midshipmen potentially face for reporting their
sexual assaults. However, the annual report falls short in portraying the
jarring experiences of retaliation that many victims have faced and have
recently come forward with in the media. On December 11, 2017, CBS This
Morning released its findings of a six-month investigation into sexual assault
at the Air Force Academy.268 Two former cadets disclosed their experiences
of retaliation and maltreatment after reporting their sexual assaults. CBS This
Morning also interviewed with two current cadets who spoke under
anonymity due to the retaliation they had already faced and in fear of future
retaliation on their military careers.269
One former cadet, Melissa Hildremyr, was mistreated by the Air Force
Office of Special Investigations, which blamed Hildremyr for her own sexual
assault and questioned the veracity of her statement.270 At the end of the
harrowing process with the USAFA, Hildremyr ultimately left the Air Force
Academy, while her rapist graduated.271 Similarly, Annie Kendzior, a
former midshipman of the USNA, testified in front of the House
Subcommittee on Military Personnel about her distressing experiences with
the administration after being sexually assaulted.272 In her testimony,
Kendzior commented on the biased procedure of the Academic Review
Board and how she was “repeatedly encouraged to resign by USNA
officials.”273 Similar to Hildremyr, Kendzior left the Naval Academy,

264. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 31, at 22. The report defines “ostracism” as a form
of social exclusion, while “maltreatment” is defined as an act by an individual “who can
legally give orders to that reporter [who] commits such acts.” Id.
265. See id. The report defines “reprisal” as actions that negatively affect “professional
opportunities and can involve a range of unjustified personnel actions.” Id.
266. Only about 1 percent of cadets and midshipmen who faced ostracism or maltreatment
qualify as experiencing retaliation under military policy and law while only around 5 percent
of cadets and midshipmen who faced professional reprisal qualify under military policy and
law. See id.
267. See id. at 23–24.
268. Current and Former Cadets Speak Out on Sexual Assault at Air Force Academy, CBS
NEWS (Dec. 12, 2017, 2:52 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/air-force-academy-sexualharassment-retaliation-allegations/?ftag=MSF0951a18 [https://perma.cc/8632-7V5D].
269. See id.
270. See id.
271. See id.
272. MSA Sexual Violence Hearing, supra note 1, at 9–11 (statement of Annie Kendzior).
273. Id. at 64.
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largely because of her stressful experience with Naval Academy officials,
while both of her rapists graduated.274
It is clear that reporting sexual assault comes at a great cost to a cadet or
midshipman’s future academic career and his or her career in the military.
Moreover, once the cadet or midshipman reports their sexual assault, they
also risk MSAs mismanaging their cases. In a system where superior officers
handle a cadet’s or midshipman’s sexual assault case in a biased manner,
what remedies are available to hold MSA administrators accountable? The
only remedy may be to seek recourse in civilian courts. However, the Feres
doctrine has foreclosed this option for the cadets and midshipmen who wish
to bring a tort or constitutional claim against the MSAs for such
mismanagement. As a result, they are left bereft of any judicial remedy at
all.275
2. Consequences of Mismanagement of Sexual Assault Cases
in Military-Service Academies
Throughout the various statements of cadets and midshipmen who
experienced sexual assault at MSAs, there exists an underlying connection:
all of those cadets and midshipmen were enthusiastic to attend MSAs and
serve their country in the U.S. Armed Forces. However, many left MSAs
due to the treatment they received after their sexual assault.276 There are dire
consequences for allowing mismanagement of sexual assault cases to
continue not only in MSAs, but in the military as a whole. In particular, the
loss of qualified candidates can negatively affect the diversity of military
leadership.
Diversity is essential in the military. In Grutter v. Bollinger,277 highranking military officers submitted an amicus brief asserting that racially
diverse officers were essential to national security.278 Officers of the military
also submitted an amicus brief in United States v. Virginia279 to argue that
women were crucial to military success by recounting important
contributions of women in service.280 In that case, Justice Ginsburg cited an

274. See id.
275. See supra Part III.A.
276. See supra notes 268, 273 and accompanying text; see also Brandy Zadrozny & James
LaPorta, Cadet Run Out of West Point After Accusing Army’s Star Quarterback of Rape,
DAILY BEAST (Dec. 8, 2017, 7:02 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/cadet-run-out-of-westpoint-after-accusing-armys-star-quarterback-of-rape
[https://perma.cc/4Q2B-3FS5]
(reporting the story of Madeline Lewis, a former cadet who was sexually assaulted at West
Point and whose long-term dream was to follow in her grandfather’s footsteps and attend West
Point).
277. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
278. See id. at 308; see, e.g., Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02241, 02-516), 2003 WL 1787554, at *5.
279. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
280. Id. at 544.
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amicus brief submitted by active and retired female service members281
which noted the successes of women at MSAs and the “vital contributions
and courageous performance of women in the military”282 to support the
Court’s holding that the Virginia Military Institute cannot prohibit women
from attending the institution because of fears that women are not capable of
becoming “citizen-soldiers.”283 Both cases presented the MSAs as
universities that train future leaders of the military. In Grutter especially, the
amicus brief was influential in establishing that civilian universities that also
directly shape the leaders of tomorrow need diversity just like the military.284
More importantly, the military has made its stance clear.285 Diversity is
necessary to the military, and the benefits of diversity, whether from racial
or gender diversity, have advanced the military establishment as a whole.286
Nonetheless, the MSA administrations’ reaction to sexual assault paints a
different picture. Allowing biased treatment of sexual assault victims,
largely female cadets and midshipmen, has already caused many qualified
future leaders of the military to drop out of school. Moreover, MSAs, who
compete with other top-ranked universities for blue-chip applicants, stand to
lose capable future leaders of the military if such practices persist.
3. Direct Impact of Sexual Assault on Leadership in the Military
Compared to civilian universities whose graduates pursue an occupation
of their choice, graduates of MSAs are required by law to become officers of
the military.287 Professor Thomas H. Lee commented on the unique nature
of MSAs:
Nor, for that matter, can civilian undergraduate colleges, or indeed, any
civilian institution of higher learning, assert the sort of robust causal claim
that the military academies can . . . . The military service academies and
officer training programs are unique gate-keeping institutions insofar as
they are a sufficient condition for direct entry into leadership of an
important public institution—the officer corps of the nation’s armed
forces.288

Due to MSA graduates’ direct induction into military leadership, cadets
and midshipmen play an important role in shaping how the military operates
and potentially have a significant impact on how their subordinates behave
within the military system as well.
The direct impact officers have in preventing sexual assault within their
ranks has been corroborated by research. One study conducted on 506 female
281. Brief of Amicus Curiae Lieutenant Colonel Rhonda Cornum et al., United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (No. 94-1941), 1995 WL 703393.
282. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 544–45 nn.13–15.
283. See id. at 544–45.
284. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003).
285. Id.
286. See id.
287. See supra Part III.
288. Thomas H. Lee, University Dons and Warrior Chieftains: Two Concepts of Diversity,
72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2301, 2317 (2004) (footnote omitted).
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veterans who served in all branches of the military from 1961 through 1997
found that 79 percent of the participants had experienced sexual harassment
during their service and around one-third of the participants had been
raped.289 Not surprisingly, the majority of the women who had been raped
had also experienced sexual harassment as well.290
More importantly, the results of this particular study showed that an officer
permitting or engaging in sexual harassment and other types of similar
behavior was “associated with a three to four-fold increase in odds of
rape.”291 The study also showed that even subtle forms of sexual harassment
could significantly increase the risk of sexual assault.292 In sum, behavior
exhibited by the leadership plays a critical factor in the likelihood of sexual
harassment and sexual assault occurring within military ranks.293 However,
as seen with Hildremyr’s and Kendzior’s experiences, many of the
perpetrators graduate and are placed in leadership positions, thereby
increasing the risk of continuing a destructive cycle of sexual assault within
the military.
It is therefore crucial that MSAs not only provide an environment in which
cadets and midshipmen are not afraid to speak out, but also ensure that
perpetrators within the MSAs do not enter the military. Considering the risk
of sexual assault at MSAs, the mismanagement of sexual assault by school
administration, and the lack of legal recourse against the MSAs for this
mismanagement, the MSAs stand to lose many qualified, usually female,
candidates who desire to serve in the military.
V. PROPOSED MODEL STATUTE: ADDITIONAL EXCEPTION FOR MSAS
If the Feres doctrine is not legally sound and has dire policy consequences,
then what is a possible remedy to legal precedent that has been cemented in
the American legal system for the past sixty-seven years? The only plausible
solution lies within Congress’s powers to legislate an additional exception to
the FTCA.
The Federal Tort Claims Act provides for thirteen exceptions setting forth
non-eligible claims. Within these exceptions, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) is the only
one that specifically addresses military service members. The statute states:
“The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b)294 of this title shall not

289. See Bryan R. Blackmore, Sexual Assault Prevention: Reframing the Coast Guard
Perspective to Address the Lowest Level of the Sexual Violence Continuum—Sexual
Harassment, 221 MIL. L. REV. 75, 96–97 (2014) (citing research from Anne G. Sadler et al.,
Factors Associated with Women’s Risk of Rape in the Military Environment, 43 AM. J. INDUS.
MED. 262, 263–71 (2003)).
290. See id. at 98.
291. See id.
292. See id.
293. See id.
294. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) grants exclusive jurisdiction to district courts for claims arising
under the FTCA.
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apply to . . . (j) Any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the
military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war . . . .”295
According to the text of this exception, it is clear that Congress intended
some FTCA claims to be unavailable to service members. For example,
under this exception, a service member would not be able to bring an FTCA
claim against the United States for sending that service member into a war
zone where she was injured. This example clearly is in line with what the
Feres doctrine has considered an injury “incident to service,” and it is
obvious why such decisions may interfere with military good order and
discipline.296 However, for other cases that are not related to combat, the
decision of where to draw the line for an injury “incident to service” is
unclear.297 What is clear is that such inconsistencies have resulted in the
Feres doctrine expanding beyond what may have been originally intended by
Congress and what the Feres Court first articulated.298
With no indication that the current Supreme Court intends to overrule
Feres, it cannot be dismantled by judges alone. Nor does this Note urge that
it be wholly abandoned or abandoned anywhere other than the specific
context of sexual assault and discrimination at the MSAs. Therefore, the only
possible avenue to specifically and cohesively address the rights of cadets
and midshipmen under the FTCA and Feres doctrine is through legislation.
Feres, after all, is a judicially made doctrine that is not required by the
Constitution. The legislative enactment of another exception would balance
not only the main concern of the Feres doctrine—the judicial interference
with military decision-making—but also the need for legal recourse for
cadets who have been sexually assaulted within the MSAs.
A potential model statute for this exception is provided here:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not
apply to . . .
(o) Any claim arising out of the United States federal service academies in
relation to military activities, discipline, and decision-making. Provided,
that, with regard to administrative acts or omissions, in relation to operation
of the United States federal service academies as educational institutions,
the provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall apply to
any claims, brought by cadets or midshipmen, arising out of gross
negligence of faculty and administrators of the United States federal service
academies, including any civilians or officers employed by the United
States federal service academies. For the purposes of this subsection,
“cadets or midshipmen” means any student currently attending, or who had
attended at the time when the events of the claims arose, any of the United
States federal service academies.

295. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (2012).
296. See supra Part I.A.2.
297. See supra Part I.A.4 (discussing the difficulty of analyzing whether an injury was
sustained incident to service).
298. See supra Part IV.A.

2018]

MILITARY JUSTICE FOR SEXUAL ASSAULT

805

This model statute is based upon another FTCA exception, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(h), which disallows claims such as battery, assault, and false
imprisonment against federal employees, except against law enforcement
officers of the federal government. If Congress can craft such an exception
to an exception, it is also capable of contemplating one for MSA cadets and
midshipmen as well. The model statute refers only to cadets and midshipmen
because they occupy a gray area between full active-duty service members
and students of higher-education institutions.299 Interference with military
good order and discipline is implicated at a higher degree for claims brought
by active-duty military personnel, as they are first and foremost employees
of the government. On the other hand, cadets and midshipmen are first and
foremost students pursuing a college education who will eventually acquire
an active-duty obligation upon graduation.300 Further, they are primarily
interacting with MSA administrations not as service members, but as
students of an academic institution.301 Therefore, Congress should enact the
statute provided or one of a similar nature. The model statute offers Congress
the ability to address the persistent sexual assault issues within MSAs
without overturning the Feres doctrine for the rest of active-duty military
personnel.
CONCLUSION
Over the nearly seventy years of its existence, the Feres doctrine has
foreclosed many options for service members seeking damages for injuries
sustained while in service of the U.S. Armed Forces. Although the Feres
doctrine has its merits, the injustices resulting from its unforgiving
application has left cadets and midshipmen of military-service academies
without legal recourse for claims regarding the school’s mismanagement of
their sexual assault cases. With harsh repercussions, such as social and
professional retaliation for reporting sexual assault, the Feres doctrine also
places undue burden upon cadets and midshipmen who wish to hold militaryservice academies’ administrations accountable for the dire mismanagement
of sexual harassment and assault that occurred on MSA grounds. The current
social and political climate also calls for reconsideration of the Feres doctrine
for cadets and midshipmen of military-service academies. With social
movements such as #MeToo302 and proliferation of news coverage of
rampant sexual assault in a wide variety of industries,303 victims of sexual
299. See supra Part IV.
300. See supra Part III.A.
301. See supra Part III.A.
302. See Stephanie Zacharek, Eliana Dockterman & Haley Sweetland Edwards, Time
Person of the Year 2017: The Silence Breakers, TIME, http://time.com/time-person-of-theyear-2017-silence-breakers/ [https://perma.cc/KJC3-SC6R] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
303. Rachel Gillett, Sexual Harassment Isn’t a Hollywood, Tech, or Media Issue—It Affects
Everyone, BUS. INSIDER (NOV. 30, 2017, 10:49 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/sexualharassment-affects-nearly-everyone-2017-11 [https://perma.cc/JH2J-D7J6]. For an updated
timeline on the #MeToo movement, see Christen A. Johnson & KT Hawbaker, #MeToo: A
Timeline of Events, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 19, 2018, 4:15 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/
lifestyles/ct-me-too-timeline-20171208-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/3TBY-5V8P].
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assault are calling for more accountability and action. In this new era of
awareness, Congress can no longer sit idly by as the conspicuous issue of
sexual assault continues unabated. The lack of remedies for sexual assault
victims in military-service academies must be addressed, and Congress must
be the one to do it.

